The characteristics of the agency problem are different in traditional, diversified and nontraditional banks. The deposit insurance reduces the incentives to monitor traditional and diversified banks, whereas non-traditional banks are more difficult to monitor due to greater opacity. Hence, the impact of ownership characteristics, which are used as corporate governance mechanisms, is expected to differ across banks with different strategy. Using a sample of listed and unlisted banks from 37 different European countries I do find that the impact of management and board ownership on profitability differ with the strategy of the bank, Management ownership has a positive impact on profitability in non-traditional banks, whereas board ownership has a positive impact on profitability in traditional banks. Management, rather than board ownership, appear to improve the profitability of diversified banks. Managers do, however, improve the profitability by increasing the risk of the operations. These findings support the idea that management ownership is important in banks which are difficult to monitor due to greater opacity and that board ownership is important in banks where government guarantees reduce the incentives to monitor.
INTRODUCTION
A bank can be categorised as having one of three different strategies, i.e. as being a traditional, a non-traditional or a diversified bank. A traditional bank focuses on taking deposit and issuing loans, whereas the main source of income for a non-traditional bank is commissions and fees from e.g. securities trading, wealth management and underwriting. A diversified bank combines these two types of banking operations and hence has a balanced portfolio of traditional and nontraditional banking operations.
The severity and characteristics of the agency problem depend on the strategy of the bank. On one hand, the incentives and ability to monitor the operations vary with the strategy of the bank.
The reduced incentives of monitoring due to the deposit insurance or too-big-to-fail (TBTF) government guarantee differ with the level of deposits and size of the bank (Merton (1977) , O'Hara & Shaw (1990) ). Banks are seen by many as more opaque than other companies making it difficult for outsiders to monitor the operations (see e.g. Morgan (2002)). The level of opaqueness does, however, differ with the operational characteristics of the bank (Flannery et al. (2004) ), Iannotta (2006)). On the other hand, whether agency costs arise due to a conflict of interest between management and shareholders with respect to risk or due to the extraction of private benefits by the management, also vary with the strategy of the bank.
Due to the differences in the severity and characteristics of the agency problems, I expect that the impact of ownership characteristics, which are used as corporate governance mechanisms, vary with the strategy of the bank. While Denis et al. (1997) ) study the impact of management and blockholder ownership on the performance of diversified industrial companies, the ownership and diversification literature has not been combined before to study the issue in a banking context. Thus, objective of this study is to determine whether the impact of management and board ownership on profitability is different in traditional, non-traditional and diversified European banks.
Previous ownership studies have focused on the impact of type of bank (see Altunbas et al. (2001 ) Iannotta et al. (2007 ), state ownership (see La Porta et al. (2002) , Berger et al. (2005) , Micco et al. (2007) ), foreign ownership (see Berger et al. (2005) , Lensink et al. (2008) , Staikouras et al. (2008) ) and blockholder ownership (Caprio et al. (2007) , Laeven & Levine (2008) ) on bank performance. DeYoung et al. (2001) is the first study to examine the impact of the level of management and board ownership on bank efficiency. Whereas the study of DeYoung et al. (2001) is done on a sample of small US banks, this study uses a sample of both listed and unlisted European banks, hence assessing whether the findings of DeYoung et al. (2001) can be generalised to a broader banking setting. By separating management and board ownership, I address the criticism presented in Demsetz & Villalonga (2001) that many studies on the impact of management ownership has included board ownership in the management or insider ownership variable even though the interests of the management and board are different.
Using a sample of listed and unlisted banks from 37 different European countries, I find that the impact of management and board ownership on profitability varies with the strategy of the bank.
More precisely, I find that management ownership has a positive impact on the profitability of non-traditional banks and that board ownership has a positive impact on the profitability of traditional banks. Management ownership does, however, not have a significant impact on riskadjusted profitability, a finding which suggests that greater profitability is achieved by increasing the risk of the operations. The results are robust to a number of model specification alterations addressing in particularly the endogeneity issue common in ownership studies and the sample selection bias issue common in diversification studies.
DIFFERENT STRATEGIES IN BANKS
The traditional role of banks has been to channel funds by taking short-term deposits from a large number of investors and issue long-term loans to a more limited number of agents in need of capital hence creating liquidity in the financial system (Diamond & Dybvig (1983) ).
Alongside the traditional banks, investment banks and mutual fund companies operate in securities trading, wealth management and underwriting, i.e. in non-traditional commissions and fee generating banking operations. Until the late 1990s US banks were prohibited by the Glass- Traditional, non-traditional and diversified banks tend to differ in terms of profitability and risk.
When assessing the impact of increased focus on non-traditional banking operations it appears as potential profitability gains are outweigh by increased risk. Stiroh (2004a) find that increased reliance on non-traditional banking operations, in particularly, trading operations, reduce the risk-adjusted profitability of banks. It is in particularly the increased risk in non-traditional banking operations that drive his result; DeYoung & Roland (2001) and Stiroh (2006b) present empirical evidence that fee-based operations such as investment banking, securitisation income and trading are particularly volatile banking operations. DeYoung & Roland (2001) argue that the difference in risk is due to differences in the characteristics of the customer relationships;
traditional banking operations are build on long term customer relationships, which increase the information and switching costs, whereas non-traditional banking operations are likely to be based on less stable customer relations as informational costs are low and competition is fierce.
Moreover, diversified banks appear to be less profitable than focused banks, in particularly in terms of risk-adjusted profitability. In a sample of small US community banks, Stiroh (2004b) finds that, when measured as risk-adjusted profitability, there is little benefits from diversification across unrelated banking activities, whereas there are some benefits from diversification across related banking activities such as across different loan classes. He concludes that diversification is beneficial only as long as the managerial skills and capacity are sufficient to manage an increasing mix of business activities. Similarly, Goddard et al. (2008) find that diversification has a negative impact on both the unadjusted and risk-adjusted profitability of small US credit unions. They do, however, not find a negative and significant connection between diversification and profitability among large US credit unions. Stiroh & Rumble (2006) contribute to the understanding of impact of bank strategy on profitability and risk by separating between the impact of diversification and increased focus on non-traditional banking operations. They find that there is a positive impact of diversification on the profitability of U.S. financial holding companies (FHCs), but that the benefit is offset by the negative impact of increased risk of non-traditional banking operations. Using a similar methodology on a sample of very small European banks, Mercieca et al. (2007) find that there is no benefit of diversification and that increased reliance on non-traditional banking operations has a negative impact on risk-adjusted profitability.
Finally, the choice of strategy has implications for the market value of a bank. Laeven & Levine (2007) find that diversified banks trade at a discount (the size of the diversification discount is smaller than the one documented by e.g. Lang & Stulz (1994) for industrial companies). This finding agrees with the notion that the increase in agency costs frequently outweighs the cost efficiency gains that can be realised through diversification (Santomero & Eckles (2000) ). With respect to the impact of increased focus on non-traditional banking operations, the findings presented on US and European samples diverge. Stiroh (2006a) find no connection between non interest income exposure and market returns among traded US BHCs, whereas increasing focus on non interest income appear to have a positive and significant impact on market return volatility. Baele et al. (2007) , on the other hand, find that listed European banks that rely more on non-traditional banking operations have a greater franchise value. Moreover, they find a nonlinear relation between reliance on non-traditional banking operations and total risk, a finding which support the notion that diversification reduces risk.
AGENCY COSTS IN BANKS

Characteristics of the agency problem
The role of the government guaranteed deposit insurance is to reduce the risk of bank runs and thus increase the stability of the financial system (Diamond & Dybvig (1986) ). The negative effect of deposit insurance is that the incentive for depositors to monitor banks is reduced as the deposit insurance covers potential losses to the depositors (Levine (2004) ). Note that in addition to the explicit deposit insurance, there is belief among depositors that the government will cover a greater amount of deposits than is required by law in case of bank failure. Whether or not depositors have the incentives to monitor banks have the greatest impact on banks where deposits stand for a substantial part of the funding, hence reducing the importance of other debt holders and equity holders. This is presumably the situation in traditional banks.
The implicit guarantee that the government will bail-out banks which are seen as too-big-to-fail (TBTF) as the stability of the whole financial system otherwise would be jeopardised, will reduce the incentives to monitor them (O'Hara & Shaw (1990) ). In effect, a large diversified bank has an insurance coverage for all its liabilities, not only the deposits covered by the explicit deposit insurance (Deng et al. (2007) ), thus reducing the monitoring incentives of both depositors and other debt holders. Hence, I expect that the incentives to monitor due to the TBTF guarantee are lower in diversified banks than in focused banks.
The empirical evidence on whether banks would be more opaque than companies in other industries, thus making them more difficult to monitor, is inconclusive. The opaqueness do, however, appear to vary with the operational characteristics of the bank. Based on their findings on dispersion in analysts' forecasts and disagreement in bond ratings, Flannery et al. (2004)) and Iannotta (2006) suggest that the greater complexity of large, frequently diversified, banks results in greater opaqueness and that a bank focusing on non interest income, i.e. nontraditional banking operations, is less opaque than other banks. Demsetz & Lehn (1985) , on the other hand, argue that companies operating in an unstable business environment, thus plagued with high volatility in profits, are more difficult to monitor. Recall, that profit volatility increase with increased focus on non-traditional banking operations (DeYoung & Roland (2001) and Stiroh (2006b)), which following Demsetz & Lehn (1985) would indicate that these banking operations are more difficult to monitor. Moreover, non-traditional banking products are particularly complex. The nature of bank assets can be changed rapidly and the valuation, especially of off-balance sheet items, can fluctuate substantially, making it difficult for an outsider to assess a bank's risk. The increasing complexity and rapid development of new products and services have made it challenging even for regulatory and supervisory authorities to monitor non-traditional banking operations (Jones (2000)). Based on these arguments, I
expect that non-traditional banks are more opaque and hence more challenging to monitor than traditional or diversified banks.
Management may engage in risk-shifting if they can benefit from the potential success, without bearing the risk of loss (Gorton & Rosen (1995) ). For example incentives schemes that make managers focus on expected profits rather than risk, may result in a situation where risks beyond what shareholders, and in particular depositors and supervisors, would prefer are taken (Stiroh & Rumble (2006) ). The deposit insurance increases the incentives for risk-shifting as it can be seen as a put option on the bank assets (Merton (1977) ). There is no punishment on the management for engaging in risk-shifting activities, as the depositors do not have the incentive to price the increased risk of the deposits as it is not borne by them but rather by the government. Marcus & Shaked (1984) ) show that the probability that a bank with great loan loss provisions take on high risk projects increases with the generosity of the deposit insurance system. Furthermore, the increased transaction orientation of banks has opened up new opportunities for cross-subsidisation from relatively low-risk relationship banking activities to more risky trading activities (Boot & Schmeits (2000) ). Finally, opacity can also induce riskshifting; e.g. too risky trading positions are not acknowledged in time due to inadequacies in internal monitoring mechanisms. Hence, the opaqueness of the operations enables management to capitalise on the option like incentive schemes. Thus I expect risk-shifting to be an agency problem occurring in banks regardless of their strategy.
Management may also be risk-averse, thus avoiding risky projects which would increase shareholder value. This is particularly likely when a substantial part of the management's personal wealth is concentrated in the bank (Sullivan & Spong (2007) ). Risk-averse management may implement a diversification strategy in order to reduce the risk of the bank with the underlying goal of risk reduction in the personal portfolio, or establish new business operations in order to secure their own position in the organisation, thus making sure that their undiversifiable human capital is utilised (Amihud & Lev (1981) ). Hence, a diversification strategy may be implemented as a result of a risk-averse manager's actions, even though the decision is suboptimal for the bank.
Extraction of private benefits is more common in diversified than focused companies (Jensen (1986) ). In addition to the reputational benefits of managing a large company, compensation size is frequently linked to company size, making growth through diversification an attractive strategy for managers (Jensen & Murphy (1990 ), Milbourn et al. (1999 ). Furthermore, as a result of managerial overconfidence the perceived private benefits are overstated resulting in implementation of diversification strategies and M&A transactions, which will not even benefit the management (Milbourn et al. (1999) ). One obstacle in implementing a diversification strategy is that the managerial skills and capacity are not sufficient to manage the diverse parts of the operations. In a banking setting, the differences in cultures, risk structures and compensation schemes used in traditional and non-traditional banking operations make the managerial challenges even greater. Goddard et al. (2004) find empirical support in a banking setting for the notion that management is inclined to pursue growth strategies on the expense of profitability.
Expected impact of management and board ownership 2
Management ownership aligns the interests of the management and shareholders, thus reducing the agency costs (Jensen & Meckling (1976) ). A few banking studies, which has addressed this issue, find that management ownership does have a positive impact on profitability. GarciaCestona & Surroca (2008) find that Spanish savings banks, which are controlled by insiders, i.e.
employees, depositors and founders, focus more on profit maximisation than banks controlled by Public Administrations. As a result the insider controlled banks also perform better. Adams & Santos (2005) show that it is not only the cash-flow rights, but also the control rights, which work as incentives for management. They find that keeping own shares in trust, thus giving management the authority to use voting rights, but not giving them access to dividends, has a positive impact on bank performance. Using a sample of small US banks, DeYoung et al. 2 The theoretical and empirical guidance with respect to the expected impact of the ownership characteristics in banks with different strategy is limited as this study is one of the first to combine the ownership and diversification literature in a banking setting.
(2001) find that a bank can improve its profitability by hiring an outside manger provided that his interests are aligned to the ones of the shareholders through management ownership.
When it comes to the expected impact of management ownership across banks with different strategy, I rely on the notion presented in Demsetz & Lehn (1985) ; management ownership is of particular importance in companies that are difficult for outsiders to monitor. Thus, I expect to observe a positive impact of management ownership on profitability, in particular in the more opaque non-traditional banks.
Stulz (1988) models the relation between management ownership and company value and finds an inverted U-shape relation. In their model company value increases with management ownership until the management becomes a majority shareholder. This relation is due to nonlinearity in the relation between management ownership and risk taking behaviour. Initially management ownership does increase risk-taking; Saunders et al. (1990) and Sullivan & Spong (2007) find that banks with management ownership have higher level of risk than banks without management ownership. As the ownership level increases, a greater share of the managers' total wealth is presumable tied to the bank. With undiversified portfolio holdings, the manager is less willing to take on risky projects, which reduces expected profits (Sullivan & Spong (2007)). DeYoung et al. (2001) find support for this theoretical model in a banking setting as they report an inverted U-shaped relation between management ownership and profit efficiency in small US banks with hired management (the relation peaks at a 17%).
The guidance when it comes to differences in the expectations on finding the inverted U-shape relation in banks with different strategies is limited. We do know that the decision to implement a diversification strategy is seen as one example of risk-averse behaviour (Amihud & Lev (1981) ). Furthermore, Denis et al. (1997) report a diversification discount among industrial companies when the management ownership is less than 10% or greater than 20%, which support the notion that management ownership is of value in diversified companies only in a limited range. Thus, I expect that the inverted U-shaped relation between management ownership and profitability is more pronounced in diversified banks than in traditional and nontraditional banks.
A monitor that is entitled to part of the success of the company has a greater incentive to be effective (Alchian & Demsetz (1972) ). I expect this to hold in particularly for the closest monitor, the board. Denis (2001) notes that companies restructuring the board often require that board members have ownership in the company. Another aspect of board ownership is that large shareholders, who also tend to be effective monitors, exercise their power through a board membership (Hermalin & Weisbach (2003) ). Using a sample of takeovers in the UK, Cosh et al. Based on previous banking literature, I am not able to determine whether board ownership would be more valuable in a bank with a particular strategy. I do, however, want to test the notion that greater incentives to monitor for the board is of greatest value when deposit insurance and "too-big-to-fail" government guarantees reduce the monitoring incentives of depositors and other debt holders. Hence, I expect the positive impact of board ownership to be more pronounced in traditional and diversified banks than in non-traditional banks.
Summary
The different characteristics of the agency problem and the expected impact of management and board ownership on the profitability of banks with different strategy are summarised in Table 1. [Insert Table 1 
Definition of variables
Profitability variables
When defining the profitability variables I rely on accounting data as both listed and unlisted banks are included in the sample. I include both return on equity, denoted as ROE, and return on assets, denoted as ROA, in the analysis. I regard ROE is as the main profitability variable is it is the one of most interest to shareholders. Noting the importance of risk in the banking sector and recalling that increased returns are typically associated with increased risk, risk-adjusted profitability variables are also used as dependent variables. To this end ROE and ROA are divided by the three year standard deviation in the respective profitability variable. These variables are denoted ROE_RA and ROA_RA. When the risk-adjusted profitability variables are used, observations of banks with recent M&A activity, of which a substantial change in assets is an indication, are excluded from the sample. Following, Baele et al. (2007) , the annual change in assets over the past two years is seen as substantial if it is less than -5% and greater than 30%.
Ownership variables
When it comes to the ownership variables both dummy variables for the existence of a 
Strategy variables
Following the approach taken in previous diversification studies, I base the definition of strategy variables on two ratios; non interest income to total operating income and other earning assets than loans to total earnings assets. The latter ratio includes off balance sheet items. As there are some concerns with both ratios 5 , I choose to combine the two (Laeven & Levine (2007) use a similar method in robustness tests). This procedure also reduces the noise of using only one bank-year observation of the ratio instead of averaging the ratio over several years. Hence, I
calculate the average of the non interest income to total operating income ratio and other earning assets than loans to total assets ratio taking into account off-balance sheet items for each bank-year observation and use the average to categorise the bank-year observations as being 4 The categorisation of the owners has required some manual work. In the BankScope database an owner can for example be categorised as "Management and employees". The number of owners in this category is, however, negligible. Hence, I have cross-checked the names of the owners categorised as "Individuals and families" with information on the individuals on the management team and board of directors found on the company home pages and annual reports. As a result these two categories have been recoded as "Management", "Board", "Employees" and "Private". 5 Net rather than gross interest income is available. Assets categorised as being traditional, such as loan, generate fee income, whereas securities categorised as being non-traditional generate interest income. (2007), where highly diversified banks are defined as banks with the non interest income to total operating income ratio or other earning assets to total earnings assets in the range of 1/3 and 2/3. 6 Thus the dummy variable for traditional banks, TRAD, takes the value one if the average ratio is less than 1/3 and zero otherwise, the dummy variable for diversified banks, DIV, takes the value one if the average ratio is within the range of 1/3 and 2/3 and zero otherwise, and the dummy variable for non-traditional banks, NONTRAD, takes the value one if the average ratio is higher than 2/3 and zero otherwise. Note that the bank-year observation is dropped if the non interest income to total operating income ratio and the other earning assets to total assets ratio give very controversial results, i.e. when one ratio indicates that the bank is traditional at the same time as the other indicate that it is non-traditional, and visa verse.
Control variables
A number of banks specific control variables are included in the model specification to ensure that the strategy variables stand for differences in monitoring incentives and ability as well as risk-shifting incentives rather than differences in operational characteristics. First, I account for differences in bank size, which may have a positive impact on profitability due to economies of scale. The findings on existence of economies of scale in a banking context are, however, inconclusive (Berger & Humphrey (1997) ). The more complicated management structure, with an increasing number of managerial layers, may reduce the efficiency of large banks (Williamson (1967) ). Size do, however, appear to affect funding costs. Larger banks may have lower cost of funding due to better risk diversification opportunities (McAllister & McManus (1993) ). moreover, Hughes & Mester (1993) show that large banks pay a lower price on uninsured deposits due to the TBTF government guarantee. Bank size is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets and denoted as SIZE. Second, I account for differences in funding costs.
Banks with a high level of deposits to total funding have access to low cost funding that can be seen as subsidised funding due to the governmentally regulated deposit insurance. Furthermore, a well capitalised bank is associated with less risk as the probability for financial distress and bankruptcy is smaller, hence reducing the funding costs (Berger (1995)). The equity to asset ratio has also been used as a proxy for management risk preferences as banks with risk-loving managers tend to have lower equity ratios (Hughes & Mester (1998) ). Hence, the total deposits to total funding ratio, denoted DEPOSITS, and the total equity to total asset ratio, denoted as EQUITYASS, are included in the model specification.
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Institutional and environmental factors such as the regulatory environment, the level of economic and technological development, and the structure of the financial system, e.g. whether it is bank-based or market-based, the level of competition from other financial intermediaries as well as from capital markets, the level of consolidation, the level of product and service innovation in the financial markets have great impact on the ability of the bank to generate profits. These differences are accounted for by including country dummy variables (COUNTRY) in the model specification, with the modification that countries are grouped with a neighbouring country if there are less than 10 bank-year observations from the particular country. In addition, year dummy variables (YEAR) are included in the model specification to capture time-varying factors in the data. Table 2 summarises the variables used and lists the expected impact of each variable on profitability.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Model specification
In the baseline model specification, I examine the impact of an ownership variable on the profitability of a bank (see Equation (1) Baele et al. (2007) ). In addition, the standard deviation in income or profitability over a number of years has been included as a measure of risk. Unfortunately, the availability of time series data is limited and such a variable would hence reduce the sample size significantly. Similarly, lagged profitability is not included in the main model specification to account for performance persistence nor is indicators of growth. 8 Management and board ownership is analysed separately to keep the presented results simpler. The results do, however, remain when the ownership variables are included in the model specification simultaneously.
In order to be able to study the impact of an ownership characteristic on the profitability of a bank with a particular strategy, I include interaction terms in the model specification (see Equation (2) The main concern with the model specifications is potential endogeneity and sample selection bias. The level of profitability may trigger the selection of a particular ownership characteristic.
For example, management or board members could be rewarded with shareholdings after a successful year. On the other hand, it is also possible that a poorly performing bank in need of drastic changes chooses to motivate the management with substantial ownership shareholdings.
Moreover, the strategy variables are not necessary exogenous; previous years' profitability, the size of the bank and owner preferences may have an impact on the strategic choices. These challenges are addressed in the robustness tests presented in section 5.3, as is the sensitivity of the results to the definition of some of the variables, in particularly the strategy variables. It is rather difficult to address these issues in particularly due to the limited access to time series ownership data which would enable a change analysis. Therefore, I consider the simpler and straight-forward model specifications presented in this section more appropriate for the purpose of assessing whether the impact of management and board ownership varies across banks with different strategy. European or ex-Soviet state country, whereas only 4% of the non-traditional banks are headquartered in an Eastern European or in Russia and ex-Soviet state country.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Traditional and diversified banks are about the same SIZE, whereas non-traditional banks are significantly smaller (see "Bank specific control variables" in Table 3 ). Moreover, diversified banks have significantly higher DEPOSITS than the traditional banks. These two findings indicate that the banks in the sample do not fully meet the set expectations, i.e. that diversified banks would be larger than focused banks and that traditional banks would rely most on DEPOSITS as a source of funding. Hence, the expectations on the characteristics of agency problem as presented in Table 1 are refined; the TBTF guarantee is expected to have an impact on the monitoring incentives not only in diversified banks, but also in traditional banks, and the incentives to monitor due to the deposit insurance are reduced, not only in traditional banks, but even more so in diversified banks. EQUITYASS is the highest in non-traditional banks, most probably due to higher needed (or required) buffers to offset the risk of high volatility in income and profit streams.
The average profitability is 12% when measured by ROE and 1.5% when measured by ROA (see "Profitability variables" in Table 3 ). The distribution of ROE is close to normal, whereas the distribution of ROA is somewhat skewed to the left. The regression results are, however, robust to a log transformation of ROA. The risk-adjusted profitability variables, ROE_RA and ROA_RA, both have an average of about 4.4 and are also slightly skewed to the left. When comparing the profitability across banks with different strategy, I find that the profitability differs with the strategy of the bank and that the difference varies with profitability variable.
When measured with ROE, non-traditional banks appear to have significantly lower profitability than diversified banks, whereas non-traditional banks appear to have significantly higher profitability than traditional and diversified banks when profitability is measured by ROA. The significantly higher EQUITYASS may be one reason for the lower profitability of non-traditional banks when measured by ROE, but a size effect may also explain the finding as non-traditional banks are significantly smaller than traditional and diversified banks. Hence, the findings of this simplistic univariate analysis support the inclusion of EQUITYASS and SIZE as bank specific control variables in the model specification. Finally, the risk-adjusted profitability variables suggest that the risks taken by non-traditional banks are not necessarily justified by additional profits.
When it comes to the ownership characteristics, I find that that the frequency of management ownership (MGT) in the full sample is 12% (see "Ownership variables" in Table 3 ). The frequency of management ownership is, however, very different in the sub-samples of banks with different strategy. In non-traditional banks MGT is 19%, versus only about 10% in traditional and diversified banks (see Columns V, VII and XI). The level of direct management ownership (MGT%) also differs from one sub-sample to another. It is the highest in nontraditional banks and lowest in traditional banks. Thus, it appears as large management ownership shares are more common in diversified banks than in other banks. Finally, I note that about 10% of the banks have board ownership (BOARD). The average percentage of total board ownership (BOARD%) is less than 2% and there are no significant differences when comparing the sub-sample means.
Regression analysis
I start the regression analysis by examining the impact of management ownership on profitability of banks without account for potential differences in their strategy, i.e. the baseline model specification defined in Equation (1) is used (see Column I to IV in Panel A of Table 4 ). I find that management ownership has a positive and significant impact on ROE. Recalling that the average ROE is 12%, a 1.7%-unit increase can be seen as economically significant. The impact of management ownership on ROA and the risk-adjusted profitability variables ROE_RA and ROA_RA is, however, not significant. Next, I consider whether the impact of management ownership depends on the strategy the bank has (see Column V to VIII). I fail to find a positive connection between the level of direct management ownership and profitability, but do find that the level of direct management ownership has a negative and significant impact on risk-adjusted profitability ROA_RA (see Column I to IV in Panel B of Table 4 ). This negative relation is particularly severe in the reference group of traditional banks (see Column V to VIII). A word of caution is in place at this point; the number of observations with data on the level of direct management ownership is limited in the sub-sample of traditional banks, which may affect the results.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
In order to gain a better understanding of the impact of the level of direct management ownership on profitability, I examine whether the hypothesised inverted U-shape can explain the failure to find a significant positive impact of level of direct management ownership on profitability. The results for the full sample suggest that an inverted U-shape is present; the coefficient for MGT% is positive and the coefficient for MGT% 2 is negative and significant when ROE is used as the dependent variable (see Column I of Table 5 ). When accounting for the different strategies by running the same model for sub-samples of banks with different strategy, I find an inverted U-shape relation between level of direct management ownership and ROE among non-traditional banks (see Column VII), but not among diversified banks. These findings contradict the expectation that the inverted U-shaped relation would be most pronounced in diversified banks. The limited number of traditional banks with data on the level of direct management ownership is most probably again behind the negative and significant sign of MGT% (see Column III).
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Next, I examine the impact board ownership on the profitability of banks (see Table 6 ). The relation between the level of direct board ownership and profitability appear to have be negative; the relation is negative and significant when ROA and ROA_RA are used as dependent variables (see Column II to IV in Panel B of Table 6 ). The negative relation is particularly evident in diversified banks (see joint F-tests of BOARD%+ BOARD%*DIV=0 in Column V, VI and VIII 10 ). This is in conflict with the expectation that greater incentives for the board would have a positive impact in banks where depositors have lower monitoring incentives.
[Insert Table 6 about here] 10 The results when ROE_RA is used as dependent variable appear to be driven by extreme outliers and are hence regarded as less reliable than when the other profitability variables are used. [Insert Table 7 indicates that the results of previous diversification studies may be driven by differences in the ownership structure of the banks in the samples. Note, however, that the impact of diversification and increased focus on non-traditional banking operations are not separated.
Robustness test
The main objective with the robustness tests is to address the endogeneity and sample selection issue. This is done in a number of ways. First, I address the endogeneity of the ownership Hence, the first step probit estimation include the previous year's profitability (PROF(t-1)) and size (SIZE(t-1)) and a dummy variable taking the value one of the bank is listed or not (LISTED) 12 . Once more, I account for ownership preferences by including the lagged management and board ownership variables MGT(t-1) and BOARD(t-1) in the first stage probit estimation model (see Equation (5)). The second step equation is as in the original model specification defined in Equation (2).
Third, I apply a simultaneous equation system where the challenge with the ownership and strategy variables is addressed simultaneously 13 . Hence, both Equation (4) and (5) [Insert Table 8 about here]
The positive and significant impact of board ownership on profitability whether it is measured by ROE or ROA among traditional banks is robust across model specifications (see Panel A and B of Table 9 ). The impact of board ownership on the profitability of non-traditional banks is [Insert Table 9 about here]
Apart from the endogeneity and sample selection bias issues, the main methodological challenge in this study lies in the definition of the strategy variables. The financial ratio used as basis for the categorisation has an impact on which banks are categorised as being traditional, diversified or non-traditional As a result the sub-sample sizes vary (see Table 10 [Insert Table 10 about here]
[Insert Table 11 
CONCLUSION
In this study I combine the ownership and diversification literature and define expectations on the impact of management and board ownership on the profitability of traditional, diversified and non-traditional banks. I argue that the agency problem varies with the strategy of the bank and that the efficiency of ownership characteristics used as corporate governance mechanisms hence also varies with the strategy of the bank.
This study presents new insights on the impact of ownership characteristics on the profitability of banks with different strategy. I find that management ownership has a positive impact on the profitability of non-traditional banks. Management ownership does, however, not have a positive and significant impact on risk-adjusted profitability, a finding which suggests that greater profitability is achieved by increasing the risk of the operations. The results also suggest that management ownership has a positive impact on the profitability of diversified banks.
Furthermore, board ownership has a positive impact on the profitability of traditional banks.
The positive impact of management ownership on the profitability of non-traditional banks indicates that banks which are difficult to monitor due to complexity in products and/or high volatility in income streams benefit from management ownership. Management, rather than board ownership, also appears to improve the profitability of diversified banks.
These results suggest that it is not the lack of incentives to monitor, but rather the too difficult to monitor aspect of the agency problem, which prevail in diversified banks. The greater complexity in the business model of diversified banks does not, however, seem to result in riskaverse behaviour among managers, or in extraction of private benefits; the inverted U-shape is Apart from the new insights on the efficiency of ownership characteristics as corporate governance mechanisms in banks with different strategy, the study contributes to the ownership literature with some empirical findings on the impact of management and board ownership on profitability on a more general level, i.e. where the strategy of the bank are not accounted for.
First, it appears as management ownership has a positive impact on profitability, which is inline with the finding presented in DeYoung et al. (2001) . Moreover, management ownership does not appear to have a significant impact on risk-adjusted profitability. This finding suggests that management ownership also induce risk-taking behaviour, a finding previously reported by Saunders et al. (1990) and Sullivan & Spong (2007) . With respect to the inverted U-shape relation between direct management ownership and profitability, found in a banking context by 
Traditional bank Diversified bank Non-traditional bank
Characteristics of agency problem
Incentives to monitor
• Low due to deposit insurance.
• (Low due to TBTF guarantee.)
• Low due to TBTF guarantee.
• (Low due to deposit insurance.)
Difficulty to monitor
• Low due to high volatility in profitability.
• Low due to complexity in products.
Risk-shifting
• High due to deposit insurance.
• High due to crosssubsidisation opportunities.
• High due to low transparency.
Risk aversion
• May be reason to diversify.
Extraction of private benefits
• High due to complexity in business model.
Expected impact of ownership characteristic on profitability
Mgt ownership
• Positive due to difficulty to monitor.
• Positive due to difficulty to monitor. Inverted Ushape of mgt ownership
• Most pronounced due to risk-aversion.
Board ownership
• Positive due to lower incentives for depositors to monitor.
• Positive due to lower incentives for depositors to monitor. Table 2 Summary of definition of primary variables used in the model specification and the expected impact on profitability regardless of bank strategy.
Profitability variables
ROE
Return on average equity.
ROA
Return on average assets.
ROE_RA ROE of the current year divided by the standard deviation in the past three years' ROE.
ROA_RA ROA of the current year divided by the standard deviation in the past three years' ROA.
Ownership variables
MGT
Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the bank has management ownership and 0 otherwise. + 
MGT%
TRAD
Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the average of the non interest income to total operating income ratio and the other earning assets to total earnings assets taking into account off balance sheet items is below 1/3 and 0 otherwise.
+ / -
DIV
Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the average of the non interest income to total operating income ratio and the other earning assets to total earnings assets taking into account off balance sheet items is within the range of 1/3 and 2/3 and 0 otherwise.
-
NONTRAD
Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the average of the non interest income to total operating income ratio and the other earning assets to total earnings assets taking into account off balance sheet items is above 2/3 and 0 otherwise. + Bank specific control variables SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets. + DEPOSITS Total deposits to total funding. + EQUITYASS Total equity to total assets. + / -
Institutional and environmental control variables
COUNTRY
A vector including country dummy variables. n.a.
YEAR
A vector including year dummy variables. n.a. ownership percentage squared (MGT%² ) and level of direct board ownership in percentege (BOARD% ). The results of the unpaired t -tests for the difference in means of the sub-samples are included at the end of the table. ***, ** and * denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
This table shows the summary statistics for the full sample and the sub-samples of traditional (TRAD ), diversified (DIV ) and non-traditional (NONTRAD ) banks. Some background information on whether the bank is LISTED or UNLISTED , whether it is a BHC, COMMERCIAL or INVESTMENT bank and whether it is headquartered in a WESTERN European, EASTERN European or EX_SOVIET state, including Russia, is presented in the top of the table. The bank specific control variables are bank size measured as the natural logarithm of total assets (SIZE) , deposits to total liabilities (DEPOSITS) and equity to total assets (EQUITYASS). Profitability is measured as return on equity (ROE 
NONTRAD
This table shows results of the regressions testing the nonlinearity of the impact of management ownership on profitability measured as return on equity (ROE ) and return on assets (ROA ) in the full sample and sub-samples of traditional (TRAD ), diversified (DIV ) and non-traditional (NONTRAD ) banks. MGT% is the level of direct managment ownership in percentage and MGT% ² is the square of MGT% . The bank specific control variables are bank size measured as the natural logaritm of total assets (SIZE ), deposits to total liabilities (DEPOSITS ) and equity to total asset ratio (EQUITYASS ). Year and country variables are included in the model specification. The standard erros are corrected for clusters of observations from the same bank. Robust standard errors are stated in brackets. ***, ** and * denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Table 6 .
Full TRAD DIV
Impact of board ownership on profitability in banks with different strategies.
Panel A.
Existence of ownership.
Panel B.
Level of ownership. 
LISTED UNLISTED LISTED UNLISTED
This table shows results of the regressions for the impact of management ownership (Panel A) and board ownership (Panel B) on profitability in the sub-sample of LISTED and UNLISTED banks. The latter includes the delisted banks. Profitability is measured as return on equity (ROE ) or return on assets (ROA ). The ownership variables MGT , MGT% , BOARD and BOARD% pick up the impact in the reference group of traditional banks, whereas the interaction terms with the strategy variables DIV and NONTRAD pick up the additional effect of management or board ownership in diversified and non-traditional banks compared to banks in the reference group of traditional banks. The results of the joint F -tests of the impact of management ownership in diversified and non-traditional banks are presented at the end of the table. The bank specific control variables are bank size measured as the natural logaritm of total assets (SIZE ), deposits to total liabilities (DEPOSITS ) and equity to total asset ratio (EQUITYASS ). Year and country variables are included in the model specification. The standard erros are corrected for clusters of observations from the same bank. Robust standard errors are stated in brackets. ***, ** and * denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. This table shows results of 1) the Heckman two-step regression where the endogeneity of MGT is adressed, 2) the Heckman two-step regression where the selection bias of DIV is adressed and 3) the simultaneous equation system where both MGT and DIV are modelled before applying the original model specification to examine the impact of managment ownership on profitability. In Panel A the profitability variable is return on equity (ROE ), whereas in Panel B it is return on assets (ROA ). The results of the joint F -tests of the impact of management ownership in diversified and non-traditional banks are presented at the bottom of the table. The standard erros are corrected for clusters of observations from the same bank. Robust standard errors are stated in brackets. ***, ** and * denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Heckman two-step (MGT in 1st step)
Heckman two-step (DIV in 1st step)
Simultaneous equation system Table 9 . Impact of board on profitability when applying Heckman two-step model and a simultaneous equation system. Panel A. 
ROE.
Dependent variable
BOARD
Simultaneous equation system
This table shows results of 1) the Heckman two-step regression where the endogeneity of BOARD is adressed, 2) the Heckman two-step regression where the selection bias of DIV is adressed and 3) the simultaneous equation system where both BOARD and DIV are modelled before applying the original model specification used to examine the impact of board ownership on profitability. In Panel A the profitability variable is return on equity (ROE whereas in Panel B it is return on assets (ROA ). The results of the joint F -tests of the impact of management ownership in diversified and non-traditional banks are presented at the bottom of the table. The standard erros are corrected for clusters of observations from the same bank. Robust standard errors are stated in brackets. ***, ** and * denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. This table shows how the bank-year observations are allocated to the sub-samples of traditional (TRAD), diversified (DIV) and non-traditional (NONTRAD) banks as different financial ratios are used in the categorisation. The shaded ratio is the one applied in the analysis and the numbered ratios are the ones applied in robustness checks. NONINTINC stand for non interest income to total operating income, OTHEARASS for other earning assets than loans to total earning assets, and OFFBALANCE for off balance sheet items to total earning assets plus off balance sheet items. The cut-off points are maintained at 1/3 and 2/3. 
ROE_RA
This table presents a summary of the regressions run with alternative strategy variable definitions as defined in Table 9 , i.e. 1) the average of NONINTINC and OTHEARNASS excl. OFFBALANCE, 2) NONINTINC, 3) OTHEARNASS excl. OFFBALANCE and 4) OTHEARNASS incl. OFFBALANCE . Panel A present the results for the impact of manament ownership in traditional (TRAD ), diversified (DIV ) and non-traditional (NONTRAD ) banks, whereas Panel B present the results for the impact of board ownership in traditional (TRAD ), diversified (DIV ) and non-traditional (NONTRAD ) banks. The original model specification defined in Equation (2) is applied. ***, ** and * denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
ROE
